If, as many psychologists seem to believe, im mediate memory represents a distinct system or set of processes from long-term memory (L TM), then what might· it be fo r? This fu ndamental, functional question was surprisingly unanswer able in the 1970s, given the volume of research that had explored short-term memory (STM), and given the ostensible role that STM was thought to play in cognitive control (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971 ) . Indeed, fa iled attempts to link STM to complex cognitive· fu nctions, such as reading comprehension, loomed large in Crow der's (1982) obituary fo r the concept. Baddeley and Hitch ( 197 4) tried to validate immediate memory's functions by testing sub jects in reasoning, comprehension, and list learning tasks at the same time their memory was occupied by irrelevant material. Generally, small memory loads (i.e., three or fe wer items) were retained with virtually no effect on the primary tasks, whereas memory loads of six items consistently impaired reasoning, compre hension, and learning. Baddeley and Hitch therefore argued that "working memory" (WM) 21 is a flexible and limited-resource system with storage and processing capabilities that are traded off as needed. In this system, small memory loads are handled alone by a peripheral pho nemic buffer, leaving central processing unaf fec ted, whereas larger loads require additional resources of a central executive. Thus, WM was proposed to be a dynamic system that en abled active maintenance of task-relevant in fo rmation in support of the simultaneous exe cution of complex cognitive tasks.
As we will detail below, there are certainly aspects of our theoretical perspective that can be traced to Baddeley and Hitch's ( 1974) views. But our approach to conducting WM research is also strongly influenced by another article that ap peared at about the same time, entitled "Indivi dual differences as a crucible in theory construc tion." In this report, Underwood ( 197 5) argued that psychological theories should be subjected promptly to an individual-differences test as a means of falsification. Most nomothetic theories in psychology make predictions about individual differences, even if only implicitly, and so testing r I I Variation from Inter-and Intra-individual Differences these predictions is an efficient means to deter mine whether a theory merits further pursuit.
Although Baddeley and Hitch ( 1974) formulated and pursued WM theory based on experiment, the question of WM function obviously lent itself to individual-differences predictions. Quite simply, ifWM were a central mechanism to higher-order cognition, then individuals with greater WM capacity should perform better on complex cog nitive tasks than those with lesser WM capacity.
These important predictions became test able a half-decade later, when Daneman and Carpenter ( 1980) created the "complex span" tasks that initiated an individual-differences approach to WM research. These span measures were dual tasks, requiring information storage in the context of simultaneous processing of other information: They therefore reflected Baddeley and Hitch's (1974) idea that the ex ecutive component of WM must be measured in a dual processing and storage context. Most importantly, scores on complex span tasks cor related strongly with measures of language comprehension, and this provided important validation for WM theory. Indeed, subsequent individual-differences research has led the way in fulfilling the theory's greatest promise-to elucidate the function of immediate memory by linking variation in WM to diverse aspects of higher-order cognition, including language learning (e.g., Baddeley, Gathercole & Papagno, 1998), comprehension (e.g., Daneman & Meri kle, 1996) , reasoning (e.g. , Kyllonen & Christal, 1990) , and cognitive control (e.g. , Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger, Shah, & Hegarty, 200 1).
These correlational findings have indicated that
WM plays an important role in a host of complex cognitive capabilitiesandthatWMmeasureshave practical value in assessing intellectual ability.
However, the magnitude and breadth of the correlations between WM span and other cognitive measures do not necessarily illuminate the psychological source of those correlations.
We suggest that individual-differences research will have its greatest impact on basic WM the ory only when it pursues questions of mecha nism simultaneously with questions of function.
Our research program has therefore addressed both mechanism and function, in the spirit of Cronbach's (1957) call to align the "two disciplines of scientific psychology" and his argument that scientific psychology should aim to under stand individual minds as well as the general, nomothetic principles of mind. To do so, we use both experimental and correlational meth odologies and examine individual-by-treatment interactions. The central question that drives our research, then, which is unapologetically tied to individual differences, has clear ramifications for general WM theory: Why do WM capacity (WMC) measures so successfully predict perfor mance across a range of cognitive abilities?
OVERVIEW OF AN "EXECUTIVE ATIENTION" THEORY OF WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY
Our approach to understanding WMC and its variation emphasizes the synergy of "atten tional" and "memorial" processes in maintain ing and recovering access to information that is relevant to ongoing tasks and in blocking access to task-irrelevant information (e.g., Engle (1995) , is depicted in Fig  ure 2 . 1. We view STM as a metaphorical "store" represented by LTM traces activated above threshold. These traces may be main tained in the limited focus of attention (con scious awareness) or kept active and accessible through domain-specific rehearsal and coding processes (e.g., inner speech, chunking, imag ery). Domain-general executive attention pro cesses may also be engaged to sustain activation of information beyond attentional focus, or to retrieve no-longer active information from out side of conscious focus. These executive pro cesses will be particularly useful when rehearsal or coding routines are relatively unpracticed or not useful in a particular context (e.g., with novel visuospatial materials, or in dual-task sit uations). These same executive attention mech anisms may also be deployed to block or inhibit goal-irrelevant representations or responses eli cited by the environment.
We propose that the extent to which executive attention is engaged by a task, for maintenance, r
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Any given WMC or STM task reflects all components to some extent
Central Executive
Magnitude of this link is determined by the extent to which the procedures for achieving and maintaining activation are routinized or attention demanding. That is, it is assumed that in intelligent, well educated adults, coding and rehearsal in a digit span task would be less attention demanding than in 4-year-old children (working memory capacity, executive attention, controlled attention, supervisory attention system, anterior attention system, common variance among diverse WM tasks, etc.) a. Most important under conditions of interference or conflict � b. Achieve (and re-achieve) activation and conscious access via controlled retrieval c. Maintain activation or access of stimulus representations, goal abstractions, or response productions either within or outside of conscious focus
d. Block interfering or conflicting thoughts and actions via inhibition
Groupinglchunking skills, coding strategies, and rehearsal procedures for maintaining activation/access within and outside of consciousness a. Could be phonological, visual, spatial, motoric, auditory, etc.
b. More or less attention demanding depending on the task, subject, and context r--------------------------------1 .....
Short-Term Memory (STM)
a. Traces or representations active above threshold, with loss due to decay or interference ""' b. Some receive further activation by becoming focus of attention/conscious awareness c. Trace consists of a pointer to a region of L TM.
Thus, the activated trace could be as simple as "look away from the flash" or as vast as the gist for Crime and Punishment span, in contrast, presents subjects with series of equations to verify, with each equation fo ll owed by an unrelated word to memorize (Turner & Engle, 1989) . Less verbal tasks include count ing span, which presents series of arrays in which to-be-counted target items are surrounded by distractors and subjects must recall the count fr om each array in the series (Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982) , and spatial (rotation) span, which presents series of rotated letters that sub jects judge to be normal or reversed while mem orizing the letters' original orientations (e.g., Shah & Miyake, 1996) . Working memory span tasks are obviously complex and multiply determined tasks, and so none of them can be considered a process-pure measure of "executive function." Instead, WM span tasks measure, in part, executive attention processes that we believe are domain general and contribute to WM span performance irre spective of the skills or stimuli involved. In ad dition, WM span tasks reflect the contributions of rehearsal, coding, storage, processing skills, and strategies that are domain specific and vary with the component tasks and stimuli presented (see also Chapters 5 and 6). Our view is that WM span tasks reflect primarily general executive processes and secondarily, domain-specific re hearsal and storage processes. Moreover, the broad predictive utility ofWM span tasks derives fr om the general, executive attention contribu tions to performance. Short-term memory span tasks, in contrast, reflect domain-specific storage and rehearsal skills and strategies primarily and executive attention processes only secondarily. That said, we should emphasize that we do not claim that STM tasks are pure measures of storage and rehearsal, without any influence of attention processes; nor do we claim that WM span tasks measure or correlate with all possible aspects of attentional processing. Instead, we think that WM span tasks are reasonably good measures of a domain-general attentional capa bility that is involved in the control of behavior and thought and is important to many cognitive abilities. Thus WM span tasks are generally better measures of the executive attention con struct than STM span tasks (see Kane et al., 200 5) .
Working memory span tasks tap into exec utive attention by requiring subjects to maintain or recover access to target information under proactive interference fr om prior trials (e.g., Lustig, May, & Hasher, 2001 ) , while that ac cess or retrieval is challenged by intermittently shifting attentional focus between the memory and secondary processing tasks (e.g., Barrouillet, Bernadin, & Camos, 2004; Hitch, Towse, & Hutton, 2001) . That is, interference encourages subjects to rely on sustained, active access to the memoranda, rather than on L TM retrieval, but subj ects cannot easily maintain that access because the processing task prevents them fr om keeping target items in the fo cus of attention (the processing task also limits use of rehearsal or chunking strategies). Executive processes thus help maintain or recover access to the target items in the absence of fo cal attention and ef fe ctive rehearsal procedures.
EXECUTIVE A TIENTION AS THE CRITICAL SOURCE OF WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY VARIATION
Our proposal, that WMC variation is driven largely by individual differences in executive at tention processes, represents a web of infer ence across correlational and experimental studies. Some of these studies, which we have described as "macroanalytic" see Salthouse & Craik, 2001 ) , have examined the relations between WMC and other hypothetical constructs, such as general fluid intelligence, using large subject samples and multiple tasks to identify each construct. Two other kinds of studies, which we term "microanalytic," take a more fm:: used approach to analyzing span-ability relations. One line of microanalytic work com bines correlational and experimental designs by manipulating variables within WM span tasks to determine how those manipulations affect the span-ability correlation. These are essen tially task analyses ofWM span that consider not only the processes required by span tasks but also the processes shared between span and other measures. The second line of microanalytic re search, using quasi-experimental designs, tests simple cognitive processes often account for a lion's share of age-related variance in higher order cognition, overwhelming the contribu tion ofWMC (Kail & Salthouse, 1994) . Much less clear, however, is whether processing-speed variation within an age group can account for the relation between WMC and intelligence.
To find out, we tested 113 university subjects in the WM span and Gf tasks used by Engle, Tu holski et al. ( 1999) , along with several STM and speed tasks. The latter were paper-and-pencil tasks requiring subjects to copy or compare lists of stimuli quickly and accurately. Because cor relations between processing speed and Gf mea sures typically increase with the complexity of speeded tasks (e.g., Jensen, 1998), thus cloud ing the interpretation of what "processing speed" reflects, we chose simple speed tasks as a most stringent test of their importance.
In order to examine the independent con tributions of executive attention and storage, coding, and rehearsal to the association between WMC and Gf, we used a nested structure in which all the span tasks loaded onto a common "STM-storage" factor to represent their shared storage, coding, and rehearsal variance. WMC tasks also loaded onto a residual factor, reflecting the additional executive attention processes engaged by the dual-task nature of the WM span tasks. As shown in Figure 2 .3, the shared "stor age" variance was a relatively weak predictor of Gf, and the residual WMC variance was stron ger. These findings support the idea that "ex ecutive" variance, tapped by WMC tasks to a greater degree than by STM tasks, drives the WMC-Gf relationship. It is also worth noting here that not only did speed fail to predict Gf while controlling for WMC, but speed also correlated more strongly with STM-storage than WMC-executive processes. Among young adults, then, with relatively "simple" tests of pro cessing speed and with untimed measures of WMC, the two constructs share little variance, and only WMC is a significant source of vari ation in general ability.
Domain Generality of Working Memory Capacity and Short-Term Memory
Our latent-variable research shows strong cor relations between WMC and Gf, therefore sug gesting WMC to be an important mecha nism of general cognitive ability. Moreover, our WMC latent variables were derived from ver bal, symbolic WM span tasks and the Gf latent .18 variables were created from nonverbal, figural reasoning tasks. This cross-domain generality indicates that the variance common to WM span tasks cannot be substantially verbal. In stead, we submit that the executive attention variance that is shared among WM span tasks reflects domain-general processes.
However, a few studies indicate domain specificity in WM span, with low correlations between individual verbal and visuospatial WM span tasks, low cross-domain correlations between WM span and ability, or both (e.g., Shah & Miyake, 1996) . We suspect that re stricted ranges of general ability and measure ment error biased these studies toward finding exaggerated domain specificity in WMC. All were derived from samples of university stu dents, some from prestigious schools, that might represent a narrow range of general intellectual ability relative to the population at large. Without suitable variation in general ability in a sample, any variability in cognitive performance must result from something else, such as domain specific abilities, skills, or strategies. (Because universities are more likely to select students from a narrow range of general ability than from a narrow range of any one specific ability, samples drawn from these populations are more likely to represent restricted ranges of general ability. ) Moreover, with respect to measurement error, these "domain-specific" studies used only one measure each of verbal and spatial WMC. With only one task per construct, the low cor relations might result from dissociable con structs (i.e., verbal and spatial WMC), or instead from other, non-WMC abilities, skills, and pro cesses tapped by complex span tasks.
To address these possibilities, Kane et al. (2004) tested 236 subjects from both competi tive and comprehensive universities, as well as from two urban community samples, in mul tiple tests of verbal and spatial WM and STM span. We thus ensured some degree of varia tion in domain-general ability in our sample and used latent-variable models to factor out sources of measurement error. We first con trasted the fit of two kinds of models for the WM span data: unitary models derived from all six WM span tasks and two-factor models with separate verbal and spatial WMC factors.
Depending on the technical details of these models, verbal and spatial WMC factors shared 70%-8 5% of their variance (correlations from .84 to .93), demonstrating that WM span mea sures tap primarily general processes and abil ities. In contrast, verbal and spatial STM measures shared only 40% of their variance, consistent with our view that complex WM span tasks measure primarily the contribution of general executive processes and simple STM span tasks measure primarily the contributions of domain-specific ones. We also tested whether the domain generality of WMC and STM varied with the range of Gf in the sample, by dividing our subjects into different groups on the basis of their matrix-reasoning perfor mance: a high-Gf group, a low-Gf group, and two groups representing the full range of Gf. We found that both WMC and STM were much more domain specific in our high-Gf group than they were among our low-Gf sub jects or our full Gf-range sample. Thus, as we suspected, prior findings of domain-specific WMC may have resulted from testing subjects from a restricted range of high general ability.
Like and Con way et al. (2002), we also tested whether the gen eral executive contributions to span, or domain specific STM-storage contributions, were the primary source of the WMC-Gf correlation. In our nested-factor model, depicted on the left side of Figure 2 .4, all 12 of the verbal and spatial WMC and STM tasks loaded onto a com mon factor reflecting their shared variance. Ad ditionally, the six verbal and spatial span tasks each loaded onto a domain-specific residual fac tor. The logic, again, was that both WM and STM span tasks reflect joint contributions of general executive attention and domain-specific STM and storage. At the same time, WM span taps primarily general executive attention processes and STM span taps primarily domain-specific storage, coding, and rehearsal processes. However, in contrast to the Engle and Conway models, note_ that we interpreted the common factor to rep resent general executive attention variance and Kane et al. (2004) . Gf=general fluid in telligence. For descriptions of the individual span and reasoning tasks, see Kane et al. (2004) .
the residual fa ctors to represent domain-specific STM-storage variance, rather than the reverse.
Our interpretation of these fa ctors had ratio nal and empirical grounding. First, given the substantial dissociability between verbal and spatial STM span in our data and in others' (see Jonides et al., 1996 , for a review), it is unlikely that shared variance among verbal and spatial span measures reflected domain-specific storage and rehearsal abilities. Second, the WMC and STM tasks loaded differently onto the "execu tive" and ''STM:... . storage" fa ctors. The WMC tasks all had higher loadings on the common "executive" fa ctor than did the STM tasks, and they had higher loadings on the executive factor than on their respective "storage" fa ctors. The STM tasks showed the opposite pattern. Thus, the executive attention fa ctor captured more variance from WMC than STM tasks, and the storage fa ctors showed the opposite pattern. In this data set, then, the common span variance re flected domain-general executive attention and the domain-specific residual variance reflected STM storage and rehearsal processes. Of most importance, the executive attention factor strongly predicted Gf (path coefficient= .52), with a similar magnitude to our previous stud ies. Moreover, it was similar to the correlation we fo und in a separate model where Gf was predicted by a WMC fa ctor derived fr om only the six WM span tasks (.64). This consistency across models and studies is compelling, given that we defined WMC and Gf much more broadly here than in our prior work, with Gf reflecting shared variance among verbal and visuospatial reasoning tests. Indeed, in a sepa rate article we reanalyzed all the published la tent variable data on the WMC-Gf correlation and fo und that WMC accounted fo r approxi mately 50% of the variance in Gf (i.e., the me dian correlation between WMC and Gf con structs across studies was .72; Kane et al., 2005) . This shared variance is not strong enough to claim that WMC and Gf are synonymous. How ever, we submit that WMC, which reflects pri marily a general executive construct, is one critical source of Gf variation. Short-term mem ory, in contrast, reflects more domain-specific storage and rehearsal processes that are less important to general aspects of ability. 2
Summary of Macroanalytic Research
As measured by a variety of span tasks, WMC and STM are strongly correlated constructs. However, despite this close relationship, the attentional processes engaged primarily by WM span tasks (and to a lesser extent by STM tasks) are responsible for WM span's general and su perior predictive utility. The executive atten tion processes that contribute to WM span tasks are an important mechanism of fluid intelli gence, and furthermore, these executive atten tion processes are· domain general. In contrast, variance associated with simple storage and re hearsal activities, captured primarily by STM tasks, is relatively domain specific (for alterna tive views on WMC's domain generality, see Chapters 6 and 8).
Microanalytic Studies of Working Memory Capacity
Two lines of "microanalytic" research, using smaller scale quasi-experiments and regression or AN OVA-based analytic approaches, have ad dressed the mechanisms of span task perfor mance and its relation to complex cognitive abilities. One line has clarified which processes are not important to WMC variation and co variation. We discuss this work first. We then review research that more closely and specifi cally links WMC to the constructs of attention and executive control.
Ruling out Some Mechanisms of Variation and Covariation in Working Memory Capacity
Task skill and processing efficienc y The idea that individual differences in task-specific skills affect the correlations between WM span and higher-order cognitive measures is an old one. Daneman, Carpenter, and colleagues (e.g., Daneman & Carpenter 1980) proposed that good comprehenders could devote fewer WM resources to the reading and listening compo nent of the span task than could poor compre henders, thereby relieving more resources for the simultaneous task of memory storage. Thus, strong language skills lead to a larger functional WMC for language, rather than a larger WMC leading to stronger language skills. In a similar vein, MacDonald and Christiansen (2002) claimed that "the reading span task is simply a measure of language processing skills" (p. 39). However, by List 3, under proactive interfer ence from prior lists, low-span subjects' recall dropped more precipitously than that of high span subjects (Ms �-50% vs. -30%, respec tively). Rosen and Engle ( I998) demonstrated span differences in interference susceptibility during learning of paired associates. In List I, all subjects learned 12 compound word pairs (e.g., bird-bath). In List 2, control subjects learned I2 pairs of semantically related words that were unrelated to the List 1 pairs (e.g., eye tear), while interference subj ects learned pairs using the List I cues (e.g., bird-dawn). High and low spans reached learning criterion equally quickly for List 1, where interference was absent. However, in List 2, low spans required an aver age of two more learning trials than did high spans overall, and low spans' impairment was especially evident in the interference condition.
Low spans under interference also committed more overt List 1 intrusions during List 2 learning than did high spans.
These studies additionally yielded evidence that WMC-related variation in interference arises from attention-control variation, consis tent with theories linking interference resistance to attentional inhibition (e.g., Ande_rson & Neely, 1996; Hasher & Zacks, 1988) . Most directly, Kane and Engle (2000) tested some subjects under dual-task conditions, in which they continuously maintained a complex finger tapping sequence during either study or recall of each list. Under both these dual-task conditions, the span groups showed equivalent interference. The secondary task had no effect on the low span group's interf�rence vulnerability but it increased the high-span group's interference vulnerability to that of the low-span group. These counterintuitive fi ndings indicate that span differences in proactive interference nor mally result fr om high spans' superior use of controlled processes to combat it (e.g., via in hibition, blocking, source monitoring, etc.). Thwarting high spans' control by imposing a secondary task increased their interference sus ceptibility. In contrast, low span subjects were less effective in engaging controlled processing to limit interference in the first place, so divid ing their attention was irrelevant-they could not lose what they were not already using.
Rosen and Engle (1998) inferred a role fo r attention in interference differences more indi rectly. Their subjects attempted to relearn List 1 (e.g., bird-bath) after learning List 2 (e.g., bird-dawn). The critical dependent measure here was cued-recall latency fo llowing the very first learning trial for each list Note that if high spans under interference conditions had blocked their List 1 associations in learning List 2 via an inhibitory process, then these pairs should sub sequently suffer some residually impaired acces sibility. Accordingly, high span subjects under interference should be slower to recall List 1 than they had been in originally learning them, and they should be slower to recall List 1 than control subjects. Low span subjects, by contrast, should show no evidence of inaccessibility for List I. This is precisely what was fo und. High spans' relearning latencies in the interference condition were significantly longer than those in the control condition. In contrast, low-span in dividuals' response times (RTs) were actually shorter in the interference than in the control condition. Moreover, high spans' relearning la: tencies were signifi cantly slower than their own List 1 learning latencies; low spans' latencies were statistically equivalentto one another. Thus, only high spans showed something analogous to a negative priming effect in relearning a list that had previously been a source ofinterference, and so was inhibited.
High-and low-span subjects recall informa tion from L TM equivalently quickly and ac curately in the absence of interference. Thus, WM span does not predict variability in all as pects of remembering. Instead, WMC appears important for learning and retrieval only when the environment presents a substantial source of interference and competition. Moreover, our dual-task and RT results strongly suggest that high spans' relative invulnerability to interfer ence stems fr om a superior executive attention capability, whereby potentially competing in formation is blocked or inhibited. Only high spans show an effect of divided attention on their interference susceptibility, and only high spans show impaired access to initially learned but subsequently interfering associations.
Working memory capacity and executive at tention in resolving response competition. If WMC reflects an attentional construct, as we claim, then WMC differences should be observ able in contexts that make no explicit memory retrieval demands. That is, variation in WMC should be associated with variation not only in memory-interference tasks but also in simpler indices of attention control. In fa ct, high span · s (as measured by operation span) are less vulnerable to salient distractors in dichotic lis tening than are low spans. Conway, Cowan, and Bunting (200 1) had subjects shadow a list of unrelated words presented to their right ear while distractor words were presented to their left ear. Either 4 or 5 min into the task, the subject's name was presented in the distractor channel. Prior research indicated that approxi mately 33% of subjects report hearing their name in such contexts (e.g., Wood & 
1995). Here, only 20% of the high span sub jects, but 65% of the low span subjects, reported hearing their name. WMC-related differences also arise in the arguably simpler "antisaccade" task of attention control. In two experiments, Kane, Bleckley, Conway, and Engle (2001) tested high and low spans in prosaccadic and antisaccadic versions of a letter-identification task. Each trial briefly displayed a letter to the right or left of fixation for identification. In prosaccade trial blocks the target location was always cued by a flashing stimulus near its upcoming location, so sub jects. could allow reflexive orienting responses to guide, or "pull," their attention and eyes to the target. Here, both high-and low-span sub jects identified targets equivalently quickly. In contrast, antisaccade trial blocks always cued the target by presenting the flash to the opposite screen location, and so subjects had to block, or quickly recover fr om, the orienting response to the flash and endogenously "push" their at tention and eyes toward the target. In both experiments, high spans identified antisaccade targets more quickly than did low spans. More over, Experiment 2 measured eye movements across hundreds of antisaccade trials, and high span subjects showed fe wer saccades toward the cue, fa ster recovery fr om these saccade er rors, and fa ster correctly guided saccades than did low span subjects.
Both the dichotic-listening and antisaccade tasks make few demands on subjects beyond blocking a habitual orienting response in the service of a novel goal. How do subjects actu ally succeed? We hypothesize that a critical aspect of preventing elicited but inappropriate response tendencies fr om controlling behavior is to actively maintain access to the novel goal. That is, to successfully block a prepotent re sponse, such as looking toward a flash, one must keep this goal especially accessible. AI'" though it may be trivial to recall fr om L TM the rules of a task, the rules of decorum, or the laws of the land, it is often quite a bit more chal lenging to behave, in the moment, according to these rules. Our view is that active goal maintenance and the resolution of response competition are interdependent processes of executive control, therefore, "memory" is an important determinant of "attentional" behav ior (see also Chapter 4, this volume; De Jong, 2001 ; for an alternative view, see Butler, Zacks, & Henderson, 1999) .
To explicitly test the id�a that WMC may be tied to the executive acts of goal maintenance and competition resolution, tested subjects with high and low spans in several versions of the Stroop color-word task. The Stroop task is a paradigmatic example of an executive attention task-a habitual, over learned reading response must be held in check to allow the novel color-naming goal to control behavior. In order to manipulate the require ment to actively maintain access to task goals, we varied the proportion of congruent trials in the task. In high-congruency contexts, most trials presented words that matched their colors (e.g., RED appearing in red), so the task envi ronment did not reinforce the goal of ignoring the word. Because the automatically elicited response to most stimuli was correct, it should have been easy to slip into word reading rather than color naming. Here, then, accurate re sponding on the rare incongruent trials, which presented conflicting color words (BLUE ap pearing in red), required that subjects main tained adequate access-in the moment-to the task goal. Failures of executive control should therefore be evident in accuracy.
In contrast, in Stroop contexts that pre sented few congruent trials and mostly incon gruent trials, the stimuli reinforced subjects' goal. When every trial demands that the word be ignored, it may be unnecessary to do the mental work required to actively maintain goal access; the task environment acts as an external "executive." Just as Americans are helped to drive on the correct side of the road in London by road signs, traffic patterns, and the ergonom ics of the car's controls, so too may subjects be kept on the desired path to color naming by a preponderance of incongruent Stroop trials. Under these circumstances, Stroop interfer ence is unlikely to reflect goal maintenance to any great degree, and it is also unlikely to be reflected primarily in overt errors. Instead, in terference in low-congruency contexts should reflect primarily the effectiveness of the com petition resolution processes carried out by the externally cued goal, and should therefore be evident primarily in response latencies-that is, in slow but correct responses.
In fact, when 75% or 80% of the trials were congruent, fo und that low spans had substantially larger error-interference effects than did high spans. These effects, across fo ur samples in three experiments, indicate a low-span deficit in goal maintenance. Although low-span subjects understood the goal of the task, and in some experiments even received accuracy feedback after every trial, they none theless often "zoned out" and made word-reading errors on incongruent trials (low-span subjects also responded faster to congruent trials than high-span subjects, a finding suggesting that they periodically read the words aloud on these trials). In contrast, when only 0% or 20% of the trials were congruent, we fo und modest span effects in RT interference, requiring large samples to reach statistical significance. WMC related differences were not found in errors in dicative of goal neglect but rather in latencies, suggesting a slowed resolution of conflict be tween elicited and desired responses.
Summary Evidence from dichotic listen ing, antisaccade, and Stroop tasks converges to suggest that WMC predicts action control in deceptively "simple" attention tasks. Low spans are less able than high spans to act according to novel goals when that action conflicts with well learned, if not reflexive, response tendencies. Our view is that executive attention processes largely determine performance of both WM span and these attention-control tasks, and so WM per se does not cause attention differences. Instead, a third variable, representing a low level executive attention capability, influences functioning on all of these selective-attention, WM-span, and memory-retrieval tasks (and, presumably, on indices of Gf as well). More over, this executive attention capability has two aspects, one engaged to keep goals of novel tasks accessible in the fa ce of conflict, and the other to resolve the conflict presented by habitual and goal-directed responses, or, in memory-retrieval contexts, to resolve interference between mem ories for similar events.
We see these goal-maintenance and competition-resolution functions of executive control as being quite similar to the proactive and reactive control modes, respectively, pro posed by Braver et al. (Chapter 4) in their dual process theory of cognitive control. Like Braver et al., we are not yet sure how these dissociable systems of control may interact with one an other. On one hand, we propose that goal main tenance is necessary for the proactive blocking of competition, as in high-congruency Stroop tasks, and so here blocking or inhibition is de pendent upon maintenance. On the other hand, the more reactive resolution of conflict seems to be accomplished independently of goal main tenance, and these mechanisms may also be the ones required for the resolution of memory in terference (e.g., Conway 
CHAllENGES FOR AN EXECUTIVE ATTENTION VIEW OF VARIATION IN WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY
Evidence from a variety of macroanalytic and microanalytic studies indicates that normal variation in WMC reflects primarily the func tion of executive attention processes. We pro pose that these executive processes keep rep resentations of goal-relevant plans, responses, and stimuli in a highly accessible state in the presence of interference from prior events and distraction or conflict fr om the task environ ment. However, in the sections that follow, we discuss some current challenges for our theory of WMC variation. We first discuss two recent findings from our laboratories that may pose constraints on our conceptualization of execu tive attention. We then consider several com plications that surround the measurement of the executive attention construct.
Boundary Conditions to the Relation between Memory Capacity and Executive Attention?
When we began investigating the connection between WMC and attention control, we had the naive sense that most cognitive processes widely agreed to be "controlled" or "executive" would be sensitive to individual differences in WM C. However, two lines of research on visual search and task-set switching have shown that simplistic view to be incorrect.
The Problem
Following the seminal work of Treisman and Gelade ( 1980) , visual search fo r targets among perceptually similar distractors has been widely considered a controlled process. That is, fa iling the automatic "pop out" of a unique visual fe ature from an array, attention is required to serially integrate the independently processed fe atures into coherent object representations. We therefore reasoned that subjects with high spans should locate visual targets more quickly than those with low spans when attention demanding search is required to find a target sharing fe atures with its surround. We were wrong. Aftet a pilot study indicated no span differences in visual search for either "auto matic" or "controlled" search targets, Kane, Poole, Tuholski, and Engle (2006) replicated this span equivalence in larger samples across several different tasks. In one experiment, high and low-span subjects searched fo r a target letter F among either Os (allowing more auto matic, or efficient search) or Es (forcing more controlled, or inefficient search). Displays pre sented 1, 4, or 16 stimuli, arranged either in a regular matrix or psuedorandomly on-screen. Regardless of the array characteristics, the span groups showed identical search latencies and slopes across display sizes. In a second experi ment, subjects searched for targets defined by a conjunction of fe atures (Fs among Es and hor izontally tilted Ts in one block, red vertical bars amidst red horizontal and green vertical bars in another); here, again, high-and low-span sub jects demonstrated equivalently large search slopes. Whatever attentional processes are en gaged by typical instantiations of visual search are not linked to those captured by WM span.
Inefficient search may be commonly con sidered a "controlled" task, but it is not nearly the gold-standard measure of executive control that task-set switching is thought to be (see Mansell & Driver, 200 1 ). In these tasks, subjects regularly or unpredictably switch back and fo rth between two or more response sets for ambiguous stimuli; in either case, task-switch sequences elicit an RT "switch cost" compared to task-repeat sequences. We have so far fa iled to demonstrate a connection between WMC and switch cost in two prototypical preparations (see also Chapter 3). In our first three experi ments, Kane, Poole, Tuholski & Engle (2003) tested high and low spans in a numerical Stroop task where subjects either identified or enumerated the digits in a horizontal string (e.g., 2222 ="two" or "four"). Within a cued prime-probe procedure, half the trial pairs re peated the task between displays and half switched the task. High and low spans showed equivalent RT switch costs in all three experi ments. We were surprised by these findings, but also concerned that the prime-probe pro cedure might be measuring something differ ent than the more typical "alternating-runs" preparation (e.g., Rogers & Mansell, 1995) . So, in a fo urth experiment we tested subjects in one of fo ur diffe rent versions of the alternating-runs task (diffe ring from each other in task-cuing and response-mapping details). Each trial displayed a letter and number, and subjects classified ei ther the letter as vowel or consonant or the num ber as odd or even. In pure-trial blocks, the same task repeated over trials; in mixed-trial bocks, the tasks alternated in an AABB sequence. In all fo ur versions of the task, high-and low-span subjects showed equivalent RTs in all of the pure-and mixed-trial conditions. Clearly, we find no evidence for a defidt in visual search or task-set switching in low spans. What should we conclude from these findings? Oberauer et al. (Chapter 3) suggest that our ex ecutive attention view of WMC is falsified. We disagree, in part because we find robust WMC differences in a variety of other attention-control tasks. However, it may be that the attentional processes engaged by WM span tasks are related only to "inhibitory" attention tasks requiring prepotent responses to be withheld, as in Stroop and antisaccade tests (see Chapter 9). This idea does not appeal to us either, for a number of reasons. First, as we conceive it, goal mainte nance and competition resolution should be quite generally important executive capabilities.
Second, the higher-order cognitive abilities that WMC predicts, such as reading comprehension and inductive reasoning, do not necessarily in volve much response conflict or restraint of ha bit. Third, we do find WMC-related differences in several visual-attention tasks that do not seem to fu ndamentally measure control of habit or prepotency. For example, Tuholski, Engle, and Bayliss (200 1) found that subjects with high spans could count the number of objects pre sented in a disorganized visual array faster than subjects with low spans when the tally exceeded the "subitizing" (pattern recognition) range of one to four items. Here there was no obvious prepotent response to keep in check (which also suggests a problem for a purely inhibitory view of WMC variation). Likewise, in a very different visual task, Bleckley, Durso, Crutchfield, Engle, and Khanna (2003) asked high-and low-span subjects to identify a letter presented briefly at central fixation. At the same time, another letter appeared in one of 24 locations along three concentric rings around fixation, and subjects tried to identify its location. The ring on which the second letter would appear was cued (with 80% validity) as "close," "medium," or "distant." As expected from "spotlight" or "zoom lens" theories of visual attention (e.g., Eriksen & Murphy, 1987) , letters appearing outside the cued ring on invalid trials (i.e., outside the spotlight) were localized more poorly than letters appearing along the cued ring. More interest ingly, for high spans only, letters appearing in terior to the cued ring were also localized more poorly than letters along the cued ring. These findings suggest that high-span subjects flexibly configured attention discontiguously, fo cusing on the letter at fixation and on a ring beyond fixation, at the exclusion of intermediary rings of space. This pattern suggests that high spans adopted an object-based attentional focus. Low span subjects, in contrast, showed a benefit for any location along or interior to a cued ring, indicative of a spotlight configuration and a space-based attentional focus.
A Solution?
Given these visual-attention findings that are not obviously inhibitory in nature, how should we reconcile our fa ilures to link WMC to search and switching? We suggest that, unlike the tasks that have yielded WMC correlations, prototypical search and switching methods do not tap volitional, executive-control processes. Of course, if we want to avoid circularity in de fining "executive attention" as simply anything that correlates with WMC, we must consider more closely what search and switching actually entail.
With respect to visual search, "guided search" theory (Wolfe, 1994) proposes that at tention is pulled across a master map of visual locations, based on activation flowing pre attentively from multiple fe ature maps. That is, attention is probabilistically guided from the highest activation peak to successively lower peaks, with activation summed from "bottom up" and "top-down" sources. Bottom-up acti vation accrues from physical differences among stimuli: the more an object differs from its surroupd, the greater the bottom-up activation to that location. In contrast, the top-down sig nal represents the subject's knowledge of the features that specify the desired target, expressed as a verbal category (e.g., "red"). If the subject knows the target is red amidst blue and yellow objects, then red features will prompt top-down activation to their locations on the master map.
Despite the "top-down" label, we see little relation between this use of advance knowledge and the attention-control processes we think are central to WMC, because search is proposed here to be passively "pulled" rather than endog enously "pushed." However, there may be some contexts in which top-down control is, in fa ct, more controlled. Wolfe (1994) proposes that top-down effects may sometimes act to reduce bottom-up contributions to the activation map. For example, if the target is a red horizontal bar amidst many red vertical bars and few green horizontal bars, then color is less diag nostic of the target than is orientation. Based 1 on this knowledge, the bottom-up contribution of orientation could be amplified or that of color reduced. As evidence for this kind of volitional modulation, when experimenters manipulate the proportions of particular non-target fea tures, subjects use this info rmation to speed their search (e.g., Bacon & Egeth, 1997). We This failure-to-engage hypothesis is supported by findings that variables expected to affect subjects' ability to sustain goals in active mem ory also affect switch costs. Moreover, mixture models that assume switch trials to produce a distribution of fast RTs on one hand (due to adequate goal maintenance) plus a distribution of slow RTs on the other (due to engagement failures) provide a good fit to the cumulative RT functions from switch trials. As another reason to expect an association with WMC, All port and Wylie (2000) propose that a proactive interference-like perseveration of task set con tributes to switch costs. Using Stroop-like stim uli, they find asymmetrical switch costs that depend more on the difficulty of the task to be switched from than the task to be switched to: for example, the cost of switching from color nam ing to word reading is larger than the reverse.
Our findings of WMC span differences in proac tive interference might therefore suggest WMC related differences in switching.
At the same time, however, there are grow ing concerns that task-set switching may not be the "executive" measure it is widely assumed to be (e.g., Altmann, 2002) . To discuss just one specific issue, most switching studies cue the task set for each trial by presenting either its name or an abstract symbol, and this cuing, allows ostensibly non-executive encoding an d retrieval processes to contaminate measurement of switch cost. Specifically, cuing paradigms confound task and cue switches (Logan & Bundesen, 2003) . That is, when subjects switch tasks, the new task is signaled by a cue that is different from the immediately preceding one, whereas task-repeat trials always repeat the cue.
Logan and Bundesen argue that these switch costs actually reflect a benefi t of repeating the cue on task-repeat trials. Their idea is that the cue-plus-stimulus compound, by itself, pro vides all the information needed to determine a response. No executive process is needed to switch task set, so task-switching paradigms actually require only one task: identify the cue and target and use them to retrieve prior stim ulus and cue episodes. Critically, when cues repeat, cue identification and retrieval are facil itated, and so task-repeat trials yield faster re sponses than those of task-switch trials.
Evidence for these ideas comes from ex periments in which cues and tasks repeated or switched independently (e.g., Logan & Bun desen, 2003) . For example, subjects were cued to make digit-magnitude judgments following the cues Magnitude or HighLow and parity judgments following the cues Parity or Even Odd. When both the cue and task repeated across trials (e.g., Parity --+ Parity), RTs were substantially faster than when the cue switched but the task repeated (e.g., EvenOdd --+ Parity), indicating a cue-switch cost in the absence of a task switch. Moreover, RTs for cue-switch trials were virtually identical to actual task-switch RTs (e.g., Magnitude --+ Parity). Data like these suggest that cue switches are responsible for most of the switch cost observed in cued pro cedures. Thus, in order to tap truly volitional and executive processes (and to be sensitive to WMC variation), task-switching procedures must eliminate the roles of cue encoding and cue-based retrieval processes.
Summary
It may be surprising, initially, that WMC is unrelated to ·search slopes and switch costs.
And, taken at face value, these null findings may seem to call our "executive attention" the ory of WMC into question (see Chapter 3). How ever, we suggest that our null effects are less surprising when we appreciate the complexity of visual search and task switching. Most task switching and visual-search paradigms are simply not good indices of executive control, and just because researchers label search and switching tasks as "controlled" or "executive" does not make them so. More broadly, given the number of WMC-attention associations we have observed, we submit that the mere failure to find a correlation between WMC and any particular executive task does not necessarily falsify our view. However, such failures do point to obviously important questions for future re search on the nature of both WMC and exec utive control, and the tasks that we use to measure them.
Measuring Working Memory Capacity and Executive Attention
We view WM span tasks as reasonably good measures of executive attention (along with a host of other processes) because their dual-task requirements challenge subjects to maintain access to information outside of conscious aware ness, recover access to information that was .
outside of awareness, or both, all in the face of proactive interference. However, a WMC measure need not be a dual task in order to tax attention control. Indeed, Oberauer and col leagues have shown that a latent factor derived from various "coordination" tasks can be in distinguishable from a "storage-plus-proces sing" WM span factor (see Chapter 3). These coordination tasks generally require subjects to keep track of a large number of stimuli at the same time, or to rapidly switch attention among these active stimuli, and so they also require maintained access to information that is mo mentarily outside the focus of attention. any remammg, unique WMC and attention control variance should not correlate with Gf as strongly. If WMC and attention-control con structs correlate weakly, or if shared WMC attention variance is not a strong predictor of cognitive ability, then our theory is in trouble.
OUR EXECUTIVE ATTE NTION VIEW IN RELATION TO OTH ER TH EORIES General Theories of Working Memory
Our view is that WM span tasks are complex and determined by many general and domain specific processes, skills, and strategies. However, variation in WMC, as measured by individual differences in WM span, reflects primarily ex ecutive attention capabilities. These executive activities are general and important to a range of intellectual functions, from controlling inap propriate actions, to learning and recalling in fo rmation amidst competing memories, to solving complex verbal and nonverbal problems. Before we reflect upon particular "competing" perspec tives on WMC variation, we first consider our views in light of important nomothetic WM the ories, such as Baddeley's "multiple-component" WM theory (Baddeley, 1986 (Baddeley, , 2000 , and Nairne's very different, more process-oriented approach (Nairne, 2002) .
The Multiple-Component Working
Memory Model
Our theory of WM variation is inspired by Baddeley and Hitch's (1974) demonstration that the cognitive problem of balancing mem ory storage and ongoing mental activity is cen tral to a range of intellectual capabilities. More over, our distinction between general attention processes and domain-specific storage processes is consistent with Baddeley's (1986 Baddeley's ( , 2000 sep aration of the central-executive (attentional) component fr om the phonological-loop and visuospatial-sketchpad (storage/rehearsal) com ponents of the WM system. However, our view differs fr om the multiple-component model in emphasizing function and process over structure. That is, we view the domain specificity of "STM storage" to reflect different perceptual bases of, and re hearsal activities afforded by, different stimuli. As we stated earlier, our process-oriented view is more akin to Cowan's (1995) conception of immediate memory. "STM" is represented by graded activation of L TM traces (with "focal attention" representing the limited, conscious portion of activated L TM), along with routin ized and executive processes that maintain activation. Cowan's model, in tum, closely resembles Wundt's (1912 Wundt's ( /1973 ) conception of consciousness. Wundt distinguished appre hension, the graded entrance of objects into consciousness, from apperception, the entrance of apprehended objects into awareness. In today's terms, Wundt argued that information could remain accessible (or activated) outside attentional fo cus. Moreover, Wundt claimed, like Cowan, that the fo cus of attention is strictly limited, whereas above-threshold activation is more broad and variable in scope. These ideas resonate with our claims regarding WMC, particularly that executive processes maintain or recover access to "apprehended" represen tations of goals, response productions and stim uli in the absence of fo cal attention or skilled rehearsal routines, and in the presence of in terference or conflict.
The Baddeley (1986 Baddeley ( , 2000 model is most obviously characterized by its structural fo cus, that is, by its separation of WM into distinct components with different attributes and fu nc tions. In general, we are unenthusiastic about such neo-structuralist approaches to memory theorizing. Although Baddeley has been more restrained in proposing structures to account for new dissociations than have L TM research ers, WM structures have begun to proliferate. Theorists now pose separate buffers for seman tic information (e.g., Haarmann, Davelaar, & Usher, 2003) , visual imagery vs. visual rehearsal (Pearson, 2001 ) , and assigning syntactic struc tures (Caplan, Waters, and DeDe, Chapter 11). As in L TM research, consensual and specific criteria fo r proposing new immediate-memory systems are lacking, and we therefore envision an undisciplined explosion of WM buffers as uexplanations" for behavior. ing records, is not easily extended into the do main of WM variation. If WMC reflected such memory-discrimination processes, even if closely tied to interfe rence, we do not yet see how they should relate to reading comprehension, spatial visualization, or moving one's eyes away from a flash. In contrast, the idea that WMC reflects an ability to maintain information in an activated or accessible state during ongoing processing is more easily applied across simple and complex cogni tive tasks. 3 Moreover, recent research suggests a strong link between WMC and dPFC functioning, and in the realm of neuroscience, the activation metaphor is less of a metaphor. For example, individual dPFC cells that are "tuned" to par ticular locations, objects, rules, or their combi nations maintain a pattern of sustained firing over memory delays for their preferred stimuli. What's more, these dPFC cells, unlike those in posterior brain areas, maintain their activity when dis tracting stimuli are presented during the delay (for a review, see Kane & Engle, 2002) . Such target-specific, delay-related activity is difficult to interpret from a neo-functional perspective that denies a special state of activity tied to immediate memory. It fits quite well, however, with our view that executive attention involves the active main tenance of goal-relevant information in the fa ce of interference and distraction.
As an "attentional" example, sustained dPFC activity that is related to goal maintenance pre dicts Stroop interfe rence. Under functional mag netic resonance imaging (fMRI), MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, and Carter ( 2000) presented sub jects with word-reading and color-naming Stroop tasks, unpredictably cued II s before each stim ulus. Fifty percent of the trials were congruent, and so in combination with the freq uent word reading demand, the overall task environment did not reinforce the color-naming goal. On color naming trials, which demanded an anti�habitual response,dPFC activityincreasedsteadilyoverthe cue-to-target delay and this increase correlated negatively with interference magnitude (r = -.63 ). Subjects who were better able to activate and sustain the "ignore-the-word" goal were also better able to resist interference from the words.
Across memory and attention studies in the neuroscience literatures, then, we see a parallel between neural activity and WM maintenance, and we view these more literal demonstrations of activation as license to use the activation metaphor in describing normal behavioral var iation in WMC.
Th eories of Variation in Wo rking Memory Capacity
The most popular alternative views of WMC variation that we analyze below, processing speed and attentional-inhibition theories, have been most widely and successfully applied to stud ies of life span cognitive development. Indeed, we will claim that, whereas processing speed seems to be important to age-related variation in WMC, it has yet to prove its mettle in account ing for within-age variation. Our discussion of attentional inhibition will be more nuanced and less decisive because, in our view, the inhibition approach is only subtly different fr om our own. First, however, we briefly consider the over lapping, recently developed views of Oberauer et al. (Chapter 3) and Cowan (2004) .
Capacity of Attentional Focus and Region of Direct Access
Although Oberauer et al. (Chapter 3) accept Cowan's (1995) conceptualization of the WM system, as do we, our view of WMC variation is distinguishable from both of these views. Cowan (2005a, 200 5b) recently suggested that WMC variation and covariation may reflect the size, or capacity, of attentional fo cus. Thus, WMC is a true "capacity" by Cowan's view, corresponding to a structural limit in the amount of material that can be held in a particular state, in parallel to the 7 ± 2 capacity limit for STM proposed by Miller ( 1956) . Our view, in contrast, is that high-WMC individuals are not necessarily able to hold more discreet representations in con sciousness than are low-WMC individuals, but high spans are better able to actively maintain task-relevant information outside of conscious ness and to do the mental work necessary to quickly recover information from inactive mem ory despite interference.
We see evidence against Cowan's view in two findings ofWMC equivalence in ostensible signatures of focused-attention capacity: sub itizing and primary memory. Tuholski et al. (200 1) found that high-and low-span subjects could enumerate in parallel (or "subitize") an equal number of visual objects (3.35 and 3.25, respectively), but low spans showed a much steeper counting slope beyond the sub itizing range than that of high spans. 
General Processing Speed
General processing-speed (PS) theories broadly propose to account for variation in higher-order cognition via the measurement of latencies from simple cognitive tasks (e.g., Jensen, 1998).
The idea is that people with low PS complete fewer mental operations per unit time, and this leads to a failure in completing some critical operations, a greater likelihood of losing the products of processing through decay, or a re duced ability to keep multiple processing streams active via rehearsal or switching. With respect to life span cognitive development, a key finding is that age-related variance in com plex cognitive activity, and in WMC, is reduced dramatically after statistically controlling for variance in mean PS (Kail & Salthouse, 1994 ; see also Chapters 6 and 8, this volume).
However, we have already reported findings from our research indicating that PS is not a promising mechanism for WMC variation among young adults. First, PS measures nei ther correlate strongly with WMC nor account for the shared variance between WMC and Gf (Conway et al., 2002) . Second, studies of re trieval interference find that high and low spans' recognition latencies are equivalent in the absence, but not the presence, of response competition (Conway & Engle, 1994) . Indeed, high-span subjects' recall latencies are actually lon g er than those of low-span subjects when the target information had previously been sup pressed when related information was learned (Rosen & Engle, 1998) . Third, high and low spans' letter-identification latencies are equiv alent in the prosaccade task when it was pre sented before antisaccade (Kane et al., Processing-speed theory cannot accommo date these results. However, even if it could be modified to do so without incorporating our theoretical premises, we would remain unen thusiastic because PS theory has yet to provide a reasonably specific psychological account for its variation or covariation. Conway, Kane, and Engle ( 1999) suggested that researchers consider the role of variation in attention control in pro ducing variation in PS within and across age groups (see also Chapter 9). For example, in creases in PS-ability correlations with PS task complexity and decreases in PS-ability correla tions with task practice seem fit for an attentional explanation. Furthermore, in studies of young adults, individuals' variability in RT is often more strongly correlated with cognitive ability than is median RT (Jensen, 1998) . Given that RT variability may reflect failures of sustained attention, RT variability may reflect executive control difficulties. At least among young adults, then, WMC-attention variation might drive PS variation, rather than the reverse.
Attentional Inhibition
Finally, an influential research program by Hasher, Zacks, and colleagues suggests that WM Variation in Executive Attention and Control 43 variation derives from the operation of inhibitory attentional mechanisms (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1988; see Chapter 9) . Their claim is that what appears to be a structurally reduced WMC in some individuals (e.g., the elderly, or young adults at their off-peak hours) actually reflects a functional reduction due to the intrusion and persistence of irrelevant information. Inhibitory attention mechanisms, which control cognition by restricting access .to and deleting information from WM, often fa il with aging and circadian variation. Thus, individuals with ineffective in hibition due to aging, normal individual differ ences, variation in circadian arousal, or what have you, suffer disproportionately from memory interference, language production and compre hension difficulties, and contextually inappropri-. ate responding. Interference and distraction are thus central problems of control and WM variation. These ideas have significantly influenced our view of WMC variation, and indeed, the difference between the inhibitory view and ours is quite subtle. Hasher and colleagues argue that WMC variation is driven largely by variation in inhibitory control. As evidence, their microanalytic work has investigated the role of proactive interference in determining WM span scores. In typical "ascending" ad ministrations of reading span, large sets are encountered only after interference fr om prior trials builds up. Thus, interference-vulnerable individuals, such as the elderly, are disadvan taged on the large sets that are most critical to the span score. Lustig et al. ( 2001) therefore tested some subjects with an ascending task, proceeding from set-size 2 to 4, and others in a descending task, proceeding fr om size 4 to 2. Additional young subjects were tested on a descending task with filled breaks between ev ery set to reduce interference fu rther. Lustig et al. fo und significant age differences in WM span in the ascending but not the descending condition-reducing proactive interference re duced age differences. Furthermore, within age groups, the span condition with the least inter fe rence (descending fo r older adults, descending with-breaks fo r younger adults) showed no cor relation with reading comprehension. Tpus, interference resistance, assumed to reflect in hibition, mediated span correlations with age and ability (see also Bunting, 2006) .
We have characterized the executive-attention and attentional-inhibition views as providing a "chicken-egg" dilemma, where one assumes WMC to determine inhibitory control and the other, the reverse (Kane et al., 200 1 ) . However, upon fu rther reflection we do not think this is quite right. Instead, whereas the inhibitory view assumes inhibition to determine WMC, we submit that a third variable causes both. Our view is that executive attention processes block sources of interference and competition, as well as keep information active in interference and conflict-rich contexts and in the service of ongoing cognitive processes. Thus, WMC and inhibition are strongly linked, but indi rectly through a rriore basic attentional con struct.
Although interference clearly contributes to particular tests of reading comprehension, WM span predicts performance in many tasks where interference or inhibition are not obviously rel evant but active maintenance should be, such as mental rotation, verbal analogies, or counting vi sual objects Tuholski et al., 2001 ). In addition, our Stroop findings, as well as those reviewed from the neuroscience literature, suggest that PFC maintenance of stimuli and goals allows for effective inhibition under some conditions. We are unsure how inhibition might account for sustained memory-related activity of dPFC cells, increasing dPFC activation promp ted by Stroop-task cues, or congruency effects on span differences in Stroop interference. More over, if resistance to proactive interference actu ally reflects inhibition (but for alternative views, see Hasher & Johnson, 1975; Underwood & Ekstrand, 1967) , we find that high spans' in hibitory control is impaired by secondary tasks, which suggests that some more fu ndamental control process governs inhibition (Kane & Engle, 2000) . Thus, we believe our more general, "executive attention" view to be more compre hensive than the inhibitory view in accounting for the breadth of the cognitive and neuroscience findings regarding the covariation ofWMC with other cognitive activities and abilities. tion span to be reliable over minutes (rs =. 7 -.8), Klein and Fiss ( 1999) showed it to be reliable over weeks and months (rs = .7 -.8), and an automated version of operation span had a test-retest reliability of .83 with an average lag of 13 days (Unsworth, 3. Nairne's approach could be made somewhat more compatible with ours by assuming that executive attention were involved in cue-driven retrieval under interference.
